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Security & privacy

Scoped security self-assessment

We review selected application controls against OWASP’s Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) 5.0.0 using source review and focused regression tests.

Current deployment revision for support: 1baa076e2940. This identifies the running build; it does not extend the dated source review.

Scope and method

Selected Nano Triage web application controls for browser sessions, OAuth sign-in, security headers, and bounded request parsing.

Manual source review and focused, repeatable automated regression tests. Each row names the evidence lane and the remaining boundary.

Selected ASVS controls

V3.3.1 · L1

Secure cookie transport

Reviewed in source

HTTPS auth cookies use the __Secure- prefix and Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, with the application path retained. Local HTTP development uses unprefixed cookies because browsers reject secure-only cookies over HTTP.

Evidence
Cookie-policy unit tests and the OAuth/session source regression in test:security.
Boundary
The final deployment's Set-Cookie headers and OAuth round trip have not been sampled in this report.
V3.4.1 · L1

HTTP Strict Transport Security

Reviewed in source

The application configures HSTS in its response security-header set, and the application configuration wires that set into Next.js.

Evidence
The browser-security-header regression in test:security checks the HSTS policy and framework wiring.
Boundary
Live response headers, domain coverage, and hosting behavior are outside this source-and-test review.
V10.2.1 · L2

OAuth request forgery protection

Reviewed in source

Google authorization uses a transaction-bound state value and S256 PKCE; the callback checks state and supplies the matching verifier.

Evidence
The OAuth/session source regression in test:security checks the start and callback paths.
Boundary
Provider-side client settings and the deployed Google OAuth round trip are outside this source-and-test review.
V2.2.1 · L1

Bounded request validation

Reviewed in source

Selected security-sensitive JSON endpoints enforce byte limits before parsing; the shared bounded-body helper rejects declared and streamed overflow.

Evidence
The boundedRequestBody unit tests in test:commercial and endpoint-bound assertions in test:security.
Boundary
This is not a claim that every application input has been exhaustively validated against every business rule.
V3.4.3 · L2

Content Security Policy

Partial

A restrictive CSP is configured, including frame-ancestors and object-src restrictions. The current policy still has inline-script/style and WebAssembly exceptions.

Evidence
The browser-security-header regression in test:security and the explicit residual-risk entry in the source threat model.
Boundary
The exceptions and live policy behavior require further review; this row is deliberately not marked complete.

Nano Triage data-flow check

Local image privacy boundary

Ordinary image preparation and OCR run in the browser. Managed visual processing requires a separate permission and is limited to selected encrypted frames.

Evidence: The privacy/security suites and the unified browser journey's request-boundary assertions.

Boundary: Local browser storage is not a secure enclave; successful same-origin compromise remains a residual risk.

Outside this report

  • The full ASVS catalog or attainment of any ASVS level.
  • Independent penetration testing or a third-party assurance opinion.
  • Production hosting, secret scopes, live OAuth, database, payment, provider, logging, and backup/restore configuration.
  • Physical-device, assistive-technology, and production traffic testing.